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Introducing full FBW for business aviation 公务航空电传系统(5)

时间:2011-12-01 09:18来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:公务机

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limits had allowed them to over-shoot optimum AOA, resulting in a “mush” effect and greater altitude loss. In high-speed pull-ups 777 pilots had to respect G limits, while in the A330 they merely pulled the sidestick to the aft stop and let the computer give them 2.5 G.
The ALPA committee approved of what it called “the carefree han-dling afforded by hard limits” but added, “We would like the pilot to retain the authority to override lim-its and protections.”
Unfortunately, that isn’t possi-ble—it’s simply an either/or choice between hard and soft limits.
The 3.0–3.5 G limit of the 7X is a significantly harder pull-up than Airbus control laws allow (2.5 G). While 3.5 G is a stroll in the park to a fighter pilot or an aerobatic competitor, a typical business jet pilot will have had zero experience pulling Gs and would probably not obtain that load in an emergency unless he panicked (and thus risked pulling the wings off).
In a roll, Airbus FBW aircraft are hard limited to 67° bank. The 7X has no bank limit, so in terms of maneuverability its hard limits are quite a different proposition—the Falcon 7X has 90° of roll in just over 2 seconds and 3.5 G avail-able, giving it high maneuverability and hard limit protection at the same time.
The throttles for the 7X move with thrust changes, whether the auto-throttle is on or off. Boeing too backdrives the 777’s throttles with its autothrottle engaged, so the pilot can always see or feel thrust selec-tion in moving the throttles. On the other hand, even in the A380, Air-bus continues with throttles that remain stationary (in the climb detent) with the autothrottle operat-ing. ALPA and IFALPA have criti-cized this system.

 


Redundancy means safety
Dassault designed the 7X with 3 main flight computers (MFCs), each of which is dual-channel (A and B), and 3 secondary flight computers (SFCs), each with one channel (C). It has programmed channels A, B and C independently to guard against common faults.
In normal operation MFC number 1 is flying the airplane. Its channel A generates the control commands, while its channel B performs paral-lel calculations. Comparator soft-ware checks A against B outputs to be sure they agree within tolerance.
If MFC 1 fails, loses power or declares itself faulty, MFC 2 will fly. If MFC 2 subsequently fails, MFC 3 flies. If all 3 MFCs fail, the SFCs fly the airplane. SFCs are single-chan-nel but they cross-monitor each other. If one SFC fails the other 2 continue—1 flying, 1 monitoring. If a second SFC fails, the lone remaining SFC will not fly because it has no monitor.
To sum up, we would have to lose 5 flight computers (MFC 1, 2
and 3 and 2 SFCs) in order to lose
our FBW ability. This level of
redundancy is greater than that
required for safety—in fact, it may
permit dispatch with single FC fail-
ure once the MEL is finalized and
 
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